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iABSTRACT
Tracking User Activity While Safeguarding Data From Attackers
by
Justin Dahmubed
Companies constantly look for ways to better understand customer activity on
their websites. Website owners may want to be able to analyze customer activity
without having to concern themselves with a government agency forcing them to
reveal their information. Multiple analytical tools have been created, most notably
Google Analytics.
In my thesis, I demonstrate how analytics data can be stored so that only the
site owners can view the data about their customers. With my design, even the
analytics site itself cannot decrypt the data after a given window of time has
elapsed. The novel aspect of my design is that the analytical data can be securely
stored and be protected against a government agency forcing the analytical site
to release the data of all users. Tracking data is encrypted with a symmetric
key that is then encrypted with a public key. The symmetric key expires after a
short period of time prior to being stored in the database. After that window has
elapsed, the key is no longer available. Only the website owners have access to the
private key for a lengthy period of time that allows them to go back and view the
data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
My thesis is a proof of concept of a web analytics system with a primary focus
on generating, storing, and safeguarding analytical data with keys to encrypt
and decrypt the data. Multiple web analytics systems have been created, most
notably Google Analytics[8]. Google prides itself on offering multiple features that
will enable website owners to better understand the visitors of their website. Just
some of the many features they offer are the number of visitors that have visited
the owner’s website each month, the routes they take to get to their website (e.g.
through a search engine search, through clicking an advertisement, or by going
directly to the website), and what devices they used to view the website. As of
April 6th, 2012, over fifteen million websites use Google Analytics with more than
sixty-percent of the top ten thousand sites using it and the same percentage of the
top hundred thousand sites[9]. Evidently, there is already a great need to track
user activity, and it is exponentially growing.
Speaking from my personal experience, I have created websites in which I have
embedded multiple tracking tools into my code to understand my visitors better.
The tools have provided me with a wealth of useful information about my visitors
and what I need to do to optimize their experience. Therefore, my main motivation
for my thesis was to come up with a prototype for how to track user activity at
the same time keeping this data safeguarded from attackers.
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21.1 Security Breaches
Turn on the news, and one will see a security breach occurring on major corpo-
rations every other week. Just to name one that has occurred relatively recently,
an online-dating service, Ashley Madison, with the slogan “Life is short. Have an
affair” had its security compromised[10]. The hackers claim to have stolen per-
sonal information about the site’s user base, and threaten to release Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) such as names, home addresses, search histories,
and credit card numbers of the users if the site does not comply with the hackers’
demands. In 2014 alone, people had up to one billion records of personal informa-
tion unlawfully accessed[11]. This is up more than fifty percent from the previous
year, and it is only getting worse. In a more global perspective, with the growing
security threat of North Korea and of the Islamic State of Iraq, better known as
ISIS, cybersecurity is becoming a major concern[12]. In the most closely related
and recent case, a terrorist attack in California prompted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to request that Apple Inc. create a new operating system that
would bypass several security features and install it on an iPhone that the terror-
ists used. Though the FBI maintained that they want this new operating system
for this phone only, Apple has argued that it creates a backdoor. In essence, Apple
would be generating a “master” key that could be used over and over again, on
any number of devices, jeopardizing the privacy of Apple’s users. Therefore, the
need to store user information safely and securely is at an all-time high.
One of the biggest groups for maintaining information security is the US govern-
ment’s National Security Agency, NSA. In an article published back in 2013, the
NSA tried to target an online anonymity network called Tor[13]. NSA performed a
successful attack against Tor by exploiting its browser bundle, which identified Tor
users on the Internet and then executed an attack on the Firefox web browser. By
using powerful data analysis tools, the NSA sifts through Internet traffic looking
for Tor connections. The article delves deeper into how they exploit the group,
but more importantly, it emphasizes the need to track user activity for the safety
and security of the national population.
31.2 How My System Keeps Analytical Data Safe
and Secure
My system places an emphasis on keeping data safe and secure and only allowing
authorized personnel to view the data. The symmetric key encrypts the data, then
a public key encrypts the symmetric key. The symmetric key expires after a week
prior to being stored in the database. This is to prevent a hacker or a government
agency from having sufficient time to hack the data even if they get access to the
system. Therefore, if time runs out before s/he can decrypt the data, the symmet-
ric key will be stored in the database, a new symmetric key pair will be generated,
and it would be the attacker’s job to hunt for the new symmetric key. However,
the old keys are encrypted by the site owner’s public key, who therefore can access
all past records with ease. Critically, the website owner’s private key never leaves
his/her system so the analytics site never has an opportunity to reveal it.
The benefit is that the system is incapable of divulging information about the
website’s visitors. Also, with the private key living with the website owner, s/he
can view the data indefinitely because the private key is always at the owner’s
disposal. The downside is that the website owner needs to manage the private
key, so that if the attacker manages to get a hold of the private key, they will just
need to get a hold of the corresponding symmetric key to be able to decrypt that
portion of the analytical data defeating the purpose of the analytical system.
Existing analytical systems do not place enough emphasis on what happens after
the attacker has been able to get into the system, which could result in the attacker
compromising the system and getting a hold of the data. My system stores the
data in a manner so that even if the attacker manages to get inside the system,
they would not be able to get a hold of the plaintext data they are looking for.
Chapter 2
Security Background Information
The goal of my system is to provide analytical information to the website owner
using the system without jeopardizing its security. Even if an attacker tries to
break into the system, the website owner would still have the data. This is all
done through the process of encryption. Webopedia gives a sound definition of
what encryption is[14]. They say it is
“the translation of data into a secret code. Encryption is the most
effective way to achieve data security. To read an encrypted file, one
must have access to a secret key or password that enables s/he to
decrypt it. Unencrypted data is called plaintext; encrypted data is
referred to as ciphertext.”
Figure 2.1 provides further illustration of what happens when plaintext is en-
crypted with a key and when the ciphertext is decrypted with a key.
2.1 Symmetric versus Assymetric Encryption
There are two types of encryption: assymmetric encryption and symmetric encryp-
tion. Assymetric encryption is more commonly known as public-key encryption.
Symmetric encryption relies on one key and that same key is used to encrypt the
data as it is used to decrypt the data. Assymetric encryption on the other hand
uses two keys, a public key known to everyone and a private key known only to
4
5Figure 2.1: Encryption and Decryption [1]
Figure 2.2: Public-key Cryptography [2]
the recipient of the message. When Alice wants to securely send a message to
Bob, she uses Bob’s public key to encrypt the message. Bob then uses his private
key to decrypt it. One must note that the public and private keys are related in
such a way that only the public key can be used to encrypt messages and only the
corresponding private key can be used to decrypt them[15].
Assymetric encryption is depicted in Figure 2.2.
6Symmetric encryption is comparably fast compared to assymetric encryption[16].
This is because it does not require the complicated math that it is required of
assymetric encryption. Symmetric encryption’s main disadvantage is having to
share the key with the recipient, since only one key is used. One must have to be
astute in order to privately share the key with the recipient without an attacker
getting a hold of it and ultimately compromising the system. This is because if the
attacker gets a hold of the key, s/he can not only decrypt the messages sent from
the sender to the recipient, but encrypt messages as well since the same key is
being used for encryption/decryption. This is not the case for assymetric public-
key encryption, since getting a hold of the private-key can decrypt messages sent
from person A to person B, but cannot decrypt messages being sent from person
B to person A, since a different key pair is used for that.
2.2 Public Key Infrastructure
A public key infrastructure (PKI) creates digital certificates that map public keys
to the rightful owner(s), securely stores the certificates in a central repository, and
negates them if needed.
A PKI consists of:
• A certificate authority (CA) that stores, issues and signs the digital certifi-
cates
• A certificate management system
• A certificate policy
For the purposes of my system, I will not use the entire infrastructure of PKI as
detailed above because the keys will not be transmitted across any network, but
will be locally stored. Therefore, I will use a simplified form of PKI instead, called
SPKI. SPKI does not deal with public authentication of public key information
and does not associate users with persons. Lastly, third party for authorization is
not required[17].
72.3 What is a Cryptographic Hash Function?
A cryptographic hash function turns plaintext into cyphertext, and it is very hard
to invert[18]. A hash function is any function that is used to map data of any
arbitrary size to data of fixed size.
Given a cryptographic hash function h(x), it must provide[18]:
• Compression –output length is small
• Efficiency –h(x) easy to compute for any input data
• One-way –given a value y making it impracticable to find an x such that
h(x) equals y
• Weak collision resistance –given x and h(x), making it impracticable to find
y does not equal x such that h(y) equals h(x)
• Robust collision resistance –making it impracticable to find any x and y,
with x not equaling y such that h(x) equals h(y)
Hash functions are very useful in security. In one example, someone can sign a
message M by using their private key to encrypt the message and send it over to
the recipient, and the recipient can verify the signature. However, if M is large,
encrypting the message can be costly to compute, therefore, a cryptographic hash
function would be ideal. There is a cryptographic hash function h, and h(M) can
be viewed as the “fingerprint” of the message. h(M) is much smaller than the
original message, but it identifies M.
Chapter 3
Related Work
Though my system is the first of its kind, it has surely had its spheres of influence.
Most notably is Google Analytics (GA) which is widely used. The number of web-
sites that uses GA is vast, and a website owner’s objectives for using an analytical
device are numerous. Though the number of objectives are endless, they can be
boiled down to five generic categories[8]. These categories are:
• e-commerce
• lead generation
• content publishing
• online information
• branding
For e-commerce, one’s objective is to use their website to sell goods and/or services
for profit. By using an analytical device, one is able to study user activity, to
create target advertisements, and then ultimately, to generate revenue. For lead
generation, the goal is to collect user information to encourage user traffic and
retention. For content publishing, the objective is to encourage visitors to return
to the website and to see what it is that has them coming back. For online
information, it is important for visitors to find what they are looking for when
they need it, so the owner would be interested in what the visitor is and is not
able to find. Lastly, for branding, the key is awareness and loyalty to the website.
8
9Figure 3.1: Leakage of OSN ID to a Third-Party [3]
3.1 Personally Identifiable Information of a user
being leaked to third-party servers
Aggarwal [3] tries to find out if online social networking sites (OSNs) are accumu-
lating Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from the users on their websites.
She analyzed several OSNs using Live HTTP Headers to study different parts of
the HTTP headers. By analyzing these parts, she was able to determine that
there were multiple types of “leakage” to these websites. The different types of
leakage happen via Referer Header, Request-URI, and Cookie, and each of them
are displayed in 3.1. She also realized that PII is leaked to third-party servers.
Figure 3.2 shows two of such examples.
Since OSNs can divulge the PII of their users to anyone who is willing to pay for
the data, one can fathom that nothing is stopping them from being able to share
this data with the primary organizations/people my proof of concept is trying to
safeguard the data from, government agencies. This is what my thesis tries to
solve by not having this data readily available. The tracking data of the users
is not divulged to third-party servers. Moreover, even if the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) asked for the PII of all of the visitors of the website, the
website owner could only provide the one-way hashed version of the visitors’ PII,
which is meaningless to the FBI. If the FBI asked for the decrypted version, there
10
Figure 3.2: Leakage of Pieces of PII to a Third-Party[3]
would be no way to attain that version since it is impossible to invert data that
has been one-way hashed.
3.2 UsaProxy
Atterer, Wnuk, and Schmidt [4] investigate how to track user activity using stan-
dard web technologies. They create a non-intrusive tracking tool. The system
architecture is depicted in Figure 3.3. Their tool intercepts all traffic and outputs
the data to a log file and track users’ activity, such as mouse movements and key-
board input, in detail through client-side code written in JavaScript (JS), while
remaining unnoticeable to the user. Researchers were trying to track what was the
most frequently used path through a website, average time spent on a page, and
mouse position. The most important part of their proxy, UsaProxy, is ultimately
logging the user activity. A sample log file is depicted in Figure 3.5.
After UsaProxy was implemented successfully, the researchers analyze the use-
fulness of the approach. They conduct the test on 12 test participants who use
a computer whose web browser uses the UsaProxy instead of connecting to the
websites directly. The users are told to perform different tasks on two different
websites. An example of mouse trails recorded by the HTTP proxy is displayed
11
Figure 3.3: System Architecture.[4]
in Figure 3.4. Afterwards, log files are produced from the proxy during the test.
A snippet of a log file is displayed in Figure 3.5. The events in the figure show
mouse movements, mouse overs, the cursor moving into an input field, and other
similar activity.
In this example, the UsaProxy does a sound job in logging the user activity, but if
an attacker were to get a hold of the files which does not seem like an arduous task,
they would be able to understand what the files mean judging from the clarity of
the log files. This is what my system tries to prevent: easy access to the log files
to preserve the integrity of the website owner using the analytical system.
3.3 User Interest Based on Mouse Movement
Mueller and Lockerd [19] detail their work on how to take into account all mouse
movements on a web page as another way to infer user interest. Their idea is to
use scripting embedded into the websites to track mouse movement (position and
their timestamps) and to send the logged data to a server for further analysis. The
approach is limited to tracking scrolling and keypresses, but individual objects
12
Figure 3.4: Mouse trails recorded by the HTTP proxy[4]
Figure 3.5: Small sample of the log output produced by the UsaProxy.[4]
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on the web pages, such as buttons are not recognized by the client-side code.
Furthermore, their system posts the accumulated data with embedded scripting,
and the data is analyzed and stored on a server. Their collection technique does
not require any additional software on the user’s browser.
3.4 Unobtrusively Studying User’s Behavior
Goecks and Shavlik [20] talk about unobtrusively studying users’ behavior. They
research actions such as scrolling and bookmarking webpages to determine user
interest. Therefore, when the user navigates to a new page, these are recorded: the
text of the HTML text, the number of hyperlinks the user clicked on, the amount
of user scrolling activity, and the amount of user mouse activity.
3.5 My Work
After perusing numerous peer-revised journals, including a few that have been
summarized in this thesis, it has become quite evident that the researchers were
more interested in tracking user activity and less concerned with securing the
tracking data. The researchers devise unique ways of tracking user activity and
storing the data in a log file, but there is little focus on encrypting the tracking
data so prying eyes cannot decipher exactly what the user did. Therefore, if an
attacker manages to get a hold of the log files, s/he would be able to make sense
of the data since it was all in plaintext. That would not be the case for my sys-
tem since the data is encrypted with a constantly expiring key and PII is hashed,
which makes it impossible to convert back to plaintext. What my thesis tries to
emphasize is the importance of keeping the tracking data and the users’ PII away
from prying eyes. The purpose of my thesis is to create a proof of concept of a data
analytical device that securely stores the tracking data in a database. It records
the actions that the user took on the particular website and encrypts the data
that is sent from the NodeJS server to the database before being stored. Also, the
tracking data of the user is encrypted with a symmetric key that is then encrypted
with a public key. The symmetric key pair expires after a week and regenerates a
new pair after the expiration date, giving an attacker or a government agency a
small timeframe to decrypt the data should they get a hold of the private key.
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By using my system, a website owner is guaranteed multiple things. For one,
all of his visitors’ PII is kept confidential and is unlikely of being discovered.
Second, all of the visitors’ tracking data is encrypted before being stored in the
database. The symmetric key that encrypts the data is encrypted with a public
key, and the symmetric key pair expires over a short period of time, so that even
if an attacker gets a hold of the private key, s/he must need to find the symmetric
key that encrypted the data. By that time, s/he has a limited time in order to
decrypt the data. Therefore, if time runs out before s/he can decrypt the data,
the analytics site’s half of the symmetric key pair will be encrypted with the pub-
lic key, and it would be the attacker’s job to hunt for the new symmetric key again.
With these security measures in place, a website owner’s visitors can feel comfort-
able knowing that their tracking data is safeguarded, except for a short timeframe
of being decrypted by hackers or government agencies should they get a hold of
the private and/or symmetric key. Moreover, website owners can encourage more
visitors to their website by letting them know that their information is safeguarded
from prying eyes. For the website owner, s/he can continue to view the data since
his/her private key does not expire. To summarize, the biggest benefit is knowing
that government agencies cannot get a hold of the data and even if they do, they
cannot decrypt the PII of the users as it has been one-way hashed nor the tracking
data as a new symmetric key pair expires too often should they get a hold of the
website owner’s (or WO for short) private key.
Chapter 4
Design and Architecture
From Day 1 of implementing the system until the end of the week, visitors will
visit the WO’s website and perform some activity. This tracking data (TDn in
Figure 4.1) is sent to the analytics site that will be encrypted with a symmetric
key to produce ciphertext. The symmetric key is then encrypted with a public
key. The symmetric key that was used to encrypt the tracking data from Day 1
till the end of the one week period is called K0, and every subsequent key will
be Kn, where n is the number of weeks since the system’s inception. All of the
encrypted analytics data (Cn in Figure 4.1) will be stored in a database along with
a corresponding ID (IDKn in Figure 4.1) pertaining to the symmetric key that was
used to encrypt the tracking data. This way, if the website owner decides that they
want to view the data for a particular visitor, they would know the symmetric key
that was used to encrypt that visitor’s tracking data by the corresponding ID. That
way, s/he will know which symmetric key will be used to decrypt the analytical
data. The symmetric key that encrypts the data for that time period is encrypted
with the WO’s public key and stored in a database. This way, if a FBI agent
demanded that the analytics site produce the tracking data, all they would be
able to provide is meaningless ciphertext that was encrypted with a symmetric
key, which is encrypted with a public key. In order to decrypt the symmetric key,
the FBI would need to get a hold of the private key. The private key belongs with
the WO, who is out of jurisdiction. My system generates the public and private
keys and transmits the private key to the website owner to enable access to the
analytical results via an encrypted email sent upon validated registration to the
system.
15
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Figure 4.1: Encrypting Analytics Data
The WO requests the analytics site to generate a report when s/he wants to see
the analytical data that has been generated over a period of time. The analytics
site will send back the encrypted analytical data, publicly encrypted symmetric
keys that were used to encrypt the data, and a KeyMap. This KeyMap maps
ciphertext ID to its corresponding key ID. This key ID allows the WO to know
which symmetric key was used to encrypt the desired ciphertext. Once the WO
knows which symmetric key was used to encrypt the tracking data, he could use
his private key to decrypt the corresponding symmetric key. Once he has a hold of
the symmetric key, he can easily decrypt the ciphertext to produce the plaintext
analytical data, thus generating the report as depicted in Figure 4.2.
In Figure 4.2, K0 and K1 correspond to the symmetric keys that were used to
encrypt the analytical data. K0 corresponds to the symmetric key that was used
to encrypt the data for the first week and K1 corresponds to the second week.
Kn would correspond to the n+1 week that the system has been in existence.
{Kn}WSO corresponds to the symmetric key after it was encrypted with the public
key corresponding to the n+1 week since the system’s inception. IDK0 corresponds
to the ID of the symmetric key that was used to encrypt the analytical data. C0
is the ciphertext or analytical data after it was encrypted with its corresponding
symmetric key, K0. CID0 is the ID of the corresponding ciphertext. Once the
symmetric keys have been decrypted, they become Kn’, which are then used to
17
Figure 4.2: Generating Report
decrypt the analytical data to produce Pn, the plaintext analytical data that is
human readable.
The KeyMap looks like this:
cyphertextID keyID
CID0 IDK0
CID1 IDK1
CID2 IDK2
Chapter 5
Implementation
In order to create my system, I used the MEAN stack. MEAN is an acronym that
stands for:
• MongoDB
• ExpressJS
• AngularJS
• NodeJS
5.1 MongoDB
MongoDB is a NoSQL, document-oriented database [21]. Its purpose in the thesis
is to store the tracking data and the PII of the users. It has both a community
edition and an enterprise edition. The enterprise edition offers an option to SSL-
encrypt the pathway from the server to itself preventing attackers from snooping
on the data being sent, which I chose to go with when setting up my system.
I chose MongoDB over other databases like MySQL and Cassandra because MySQL
does not use the SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol for secure connections be-
tween the client and server, though it does support TLS (Transport Layer Secu-
rity), the successor to SSL. Secondly, Cassandra does support the SSL protocol,
18
19
but I find establishing the SSL connection between the server and database sig-
nificantly easier for MongoDB as opposed to Cassandra. Thus, I chose to go with
MongoDB as the systems database.
5.2 ExpressJS
ExpressJS is a Node.js framework, which is used to build single-page, multi-page,
and hybrid web applications[22]. In the context of the thesis, its purpose is to
do all of the sophisticated work of matching specific HTTP requests to code that
needs to be executed to service the request.
5.3 AngularJS
AngularJS is an open-source web application framework developed by Google[23].
It was developed to address the challenges encountered in developing single-page
applications. It is the frontend portion of the MEAN stack. Essentially, it is
executed on the browser and handles the button pushing that takes place on my
system.
There are at least two other MV* frameworks I could have gone with, but I chose
to go with AngularJS. Those other two frameworks are Backbone and Ember[6].
MV* stands for Model-View-Wildcard, where the Wildcard can refer to C for Con-
troller, VM for View-Model, P for Presenter, and there are many others[24]. One
of the more popular design patterns, MVC (Model-View-Controller), was designed
to separate the user interface logic from the business logic[25].
1. Model. The model manages the data of the application domain, and re-
sponds to the View for information about its state, and to the Controller for
instructions to change state.
2. View. The view manages the display of information.
3. Controller. The controller interprets the user’s mouse and keyboard inputs,
informing the model and/or the view to change as appropriate.
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Figure 5.1: MVC[5]
Figure 5.1 provides a better illustration of MVC and how each component depends
on the others.
AngularJS has the largest community out of the two other frameworks, which
means that the framework is stable and robust. There is a lot of support and
features offered by AngularJS with a large Question and Answer section on the
popular developer website, Stack Overflow. When a significant number of people
are working on an open-source framework, they will be able to recognize any bugs
that occur in the framework as opposed to a framework that is not as widely used.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the popularity of AngularJS compared to the two other
similar frameworks.
Though Figure 5.2 shows only the current state of each framework, Figure 5.3
shows the popularity growth of each of the frameworks with AngularJS having a
significantly higher growth rate compared to the other frameworks.
Also, page load times are crucial for the success of the website, since the user
will not exhibit much patience if the application takes a while to load. When
looking at Figure 5.4, considering the size of the framework is not enough (the
second column), one must also include the size of the framework’s corresponding
dependencies (the third column) to determine the actual size of the framework to
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of AngularJS’ Popularity to Other Frameworks’[6]
Figure 5.3: Comparison of AngularJS’ Popularity Growth Rate to Other Frameworks’[6]
be loaded. Therefore, out of the three frameworks, AngularJS is the smallest size
to load with only 39.5kb compared to Backbone’s 64.1kb and Ember’s 136.2kb.
Lastly and most importantly, AngularJS has received significant corporate back-
ing, since it was developed by Google. Therefore, with so many advantages to
using AngularJS, it was an easy decision to go with AngularJS.
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of AngularJS’ Size to Other Frameworks’ [6]
5.4 NodeJS
Node.js is an open-source, cross-platform runtime environment for developing
server-side Web applications[26]. Node.js is not a JavaScript framework, but its
applications are written in JavaScript. It served as the server in my thesis and
handled requests generated by the client. It would also send encrypted data to
the database over SSL.
5.5 A Further Look Into The Architecture
The security precautions that my system takes are as follows. It uses the open-
source web server called Nginx, but in this case, it creates a reverse proxy server
to establish a HTTPS (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure) connection from the
browser to the server. In insecure connections between the browser and the server,
an HTTP connection is created. The difference between HTTPS and HTTP is
that with HTTPS the data sent from the browser to the server is encrypted using
SSL.
When one visits an SSL-encrypted website, s/he would see what is depicted in
Figure 5.5 in the address bar.
Not only is the pathway from the browser to the server SSL-encrypted, the pathway
from the application server to the database is SSL-encrypted as well. SSL is a
security protocol that allows sensitive information like credit card information and
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Figure 5.5: HTTPS in the Browser[7]
social security numbers to be transmitted securely. The SSL protocol determines
how the necessary information is encrypted and sent to the corresponding recipient.
All browsers have the capability to interact with secured web servers using the
SSL protocol. When the user registers at my website, as mentioned previously,
public and private keys are generated using Diffie-Hellman encryption functions in
NodeJS. These keys are always within the memory of the local server and are not
transported across any network. Furthermore, it is important that the NodeJS
binary code bindings be obtained from a trusted and authenticated source, so
that there is no opportunity for a hacker to compromise the NodeJS binaries by
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embedding malware into the binding.
In the system, keys are generated by calling crypto.getDiffieHellman(groupName).
This creates a predefined DiffieHellman key exchange object. ‘Modp14’ is the
supported group. The returned object mimics the interface of objects created
by crypto.createDiffieHellman(), but this will not allow changing the keys (with
diffieHellman.setPublicKey() for example) [27]. This functions advantage is that
the parties do not have to generate nor exchange a group modulus beforehand,
saving both processor and communication time. Furthermore, this enables secu-
rity protection because the group modulus is not being exchanged across processes.
The keys returned are 256 bytes long (2048 bits) each. These keys are sufficiently
long because they reduce the probability of a hacker randomly guessing the right
combination of bits to a chance of 1/(22048). The private key is sent to the WO
via an encrypted email sent upon validated registration to the system. As men-
tioned previously, the symmetric key pair is changed on a weekly basis in order
to reduce the probability of a successful hack because the target has moved while
the hacker is still preparing to attack it. The way to implement this is to use
a NodeJS setTimeout() function with a callback parameter that will be invoked
when the timeout expires. The setTimeout() function requires a timeout value in
milliseconds. Therefore, for a weeks duration, the timeout value should be set to
3600 seconds * 103 milliseconds * 24 hours * 7 days = 604,800,000 milliseconds.
This is well within the maximum timeout limit of approximately 25 days [28].
Therefore, there should be no problem implementing it for a 7-day timeout.
Furthermore, this encrypted email will enforce that a return acknowledgement
email be sent back to my system to ensure that the encryption credentials were
opened by an authorized person on the website owner’s email domain, not any
unauthorized third-party. The email headers of the returned acknowledgement
will be examined by my system to ensure that it was opened at the properly
authorized IP address. Furthermore, overall security is additionally enhanced
by enforcing a twelve-hour time window for the credentials to be opened by the
authorized, registered website owner. If a properly authenticated returned email
acknowledgement is not received within this twelve-hour time window, those keys
are invalidated, a new pair of keys is generated, and a new email is sent. This
process will repeat until a properly authenticated returned email acknowledgment
is received within the twelve-hour time window.
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Figure 5.6: Login Interface
Figure 5.7: Activity Interface
The username is encrypted and their corresponding passwords are one-way hashed.
Figure 5.6 shows what the new user sees when they are attempting to register at
the website.
If they are successfully able to register at the website, they are directed to the
homepage where they click “play” on a video in a separate link and the counter
for the number of clicks will increase and be outputted. Also, the id for the video
being clicked is encrypted to further bolster the security of the website. Figure 5.7
illustrates what the user sees when they are able to successfully register or login
to the website.
By cryptographically hashing the passwords, it makes it impossible to invert. That
means that the plaintext password is converted into a meaningless string, but
that meaningless string cannot be converted back into the plaintext password.
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Figure 5.8: Encrypted Tracking Data
This makes it impossible for the user to understand what his password means
after being hashed, let alone the subject of the thesis, a government agency. By
doing so, none of the users’ PII can be exposed alleviating users’ concerns of the
consequences of having their PII compromised.
For a properly authorized and authenticated website owner to access my system,
that person will access my secure website via HTTPS server, open a SSL-secure
session with the proper username and password, and enter the key information to
access the results stored in my system. Any improper login or key information
will be deemed to be an unauthorized attack and cause the website to be locked
out for a period of one hour. Furthermore, the current keys will be encrypted with
WO’s public key and the new symmetric key is used for future analysis. A new set
of keys will be emailed as per the procedure described above. This safeguard will
prevent automated bot attacks from trying to speedily discover the appropriate
keys. Additionally, the originating IP address of the malware attack will be logged,
blacklisted, and excluded from my system server’s domain response.
5.6 What a Hacker Would See
If a hacker seizes tracking data being stored in the database, s/he will not be able
to make any sense of it. Figure 5.8 displays what the hacker would see if s/he were
to hack the system and get a hold of the tracking data.
The only information that the user would have is the first name of the user who
signed up on the website. The actual tracking data is encrypted.
If the hacker were to get a hold of the user data, s/he would also only have the
name of the user but not his/her corresponding password as that has been one-way
hashed as can be seen in Figure 5.9.
Knowing this, a user should feel confident about signing up for the particular
website implementing the analytical system as I have gone to great lengths to
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Figure 5.9: Encrypted User Data
keep the critical data secure and unreadable to hackers who manage to get a hold
of the data.
5.7 How a Website Owner Accesses Data
The website owner can only access encrypted data via a NodeJS script that can
only be accessed through secure shell (SSH). No world-accessible web front-end is
provided, which limits the number of potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited
to access sensitive data. Another away of putting this is that the website owner
can only access the encrypted data through SSH, which is a technology that is
mature and known to be highly secure. Building a custom web front-end that is
accessible to the Internet would risk introducing a number of vulnerabilities that
could be exploited. The script itself uses the same technology that the website
back-end server uses. The MongoDB database is accessed through NodeJS via
Mongoose, an elegant MongoDB object model for NodeJS. Mongoose is aware
of the encryption that has been performed on the MongoDB documents, so it is
automatically decrypted when queried from the database. The unencrypted form
of the data only exists in the server’s memory for the short period of time while
the script is being executed. When the website owner wants to view the user and
tracking data, s/he would use their private key to decrypt the symmetric key to
finally decrypt the tracking data. A portion of the decrypted data is the user’s
name and the tracking data as depicted in Figure 5.10
The website owner could also decrypt the data stored in the “user” table, and the
data is displayed in Figure 6.2. As one can see, the user’s name and additional
information is provided. What is not provided is the user’s password as that
has been one-way hashed corroborating the fact that when data has been one-way
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Figure 5.10: Decrypted Tracking Data
Figure 5.11: Decrypted User Data
hashed, there is no way to get the unencrypted form of that data further bolstering
the security of the system.
5.8 SSH
When developing a web application, all relevant code exists on the development
machine. In this case, it is my laptop. When a web application is actually launched
into production, however, the code is put on a server in some remote location. This
server runs all the programs that were run on the development machine during
production (e.g. Nginx, MongoDB, etc.), but is configured in such a way that any
machine on the Internet has access to the web application. This contrasts to what
was done while developing, during which time the web application was accessible
only on the development machine.
In order to set up the remote server (i.e. install all necessary programs, write
the configuration scripts, put code files in the appropriate locations), one uses
SSH. SSH stands for “Secure Shell” and is an industry standard way of accessing
remote machines securely. By using this technology to access the encrypted data
generated by users (as described above), one is guaranteed a much more secure
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Figure 5.12: System diagram
system than if they were to write a web front-end to access the secure data. SSH
is simple and proven, whereas a web application administration system involves a
number of additional technologies (NodeJS, AngularJS, Nginx), each of which can
introduce vulnerabilities in the system.
5.9 Bringing It All Together
After discussing the multiple parts of the system, it’s time to bring it all together.
Figure 5.12 is a diagram of the entire system from when the user tries to log in to
the website, to how the data is sent from the web server to the application server,
and how the data is sent from the application server to the database to finally be
stored at rest. All the while, the three pathways are SSL-encrypted.
Chapter 6
Experiments
In order to verify my system runs according to expectations, I created some test
cases. I wanted to test whether my system encrypts and decrypts the tracking
data, how long does it take to generate the report, and what factors influence the
length of time it takes to generate the report.
6.1 Does tracking data get encrypted?
The first case that I wanted to verify is whether or not the tracking data gets
encrypted prior to being stored in the database. Figure 6.1 shows the tracking
data for ten visitors to the website. All that is visible to an attacker are the names
of the visitors, but what they did on the site is incomprehensible.
This proves that my system is able to send tracking data from the browser to the
analytics site in a safe, secure manner, encrypt the data with a symmetric key,
and have it be stored inside the database.
Figure 6.1: Encrypted Tracking Data
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Figure 6.2: Decrypted Analytical Results
6.2 Is the tracking data capable of being de-
crypted?
The second case that I wanted to verify is whether or not the tracking data is
capable of being decrypted for the WO’s use. Figure 6.2 shows what the WO
would see when they are able to decrypt the encrypted tracking data, showing the
usernames of the sample of ten visitors and the number of times they clicked on
the video on the website, respectively.
This proves that the website owners are able to request the analytical data from
the analytics site upon proper authentication, receive it in its entirety, and be able
to decrypt the data with their private keys in order to get the plaintext version of
the tracking data.
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6.3 How long does it take to generate the re-
port?
The third case that I wanted to test for is how long does it to take to generate
the analytical report. Inside the report are the visitors’ names, the number of
times they clicked on the video, and their unique ID to distinguish between users,
primarily in the case where they share the same name.
I generated reports for a site with 500 new visitors per week for 4 weeks:
• First week: 500 visitors, 1 key
• Second week: 1000 visitors, 2 keys
• Third week: 1500 visitors, 3 keys
• Fourth week: 2000 visitors, 4 keys
# of Visitors Time for unencrypted (ms) Time for encrypted (ms)
500 33.1 64.4
1000 63.1 126.1
1500 94.3 192.1
2000 124.0 257.0
Table 6.1: Milliseconds to Generate Report Depending on Number of Keys
Table 6.1 displays the number of milliseconds it takes to generate the report when
data is unencrypted and encrypted prior to being stored in the database with
the number of milliseconds steadily increasing as the number of visitors and the
number of symmetric key pairs increase. This is to be expected since as the
time increases between the system’s inception and when the WO requests the
generated report, more encrypted symmetric keys will be sent over to the WO
who has to decrypt the data with more of his symmetric keys. This increase in
resources needed to generate the report is what leads to an increase in the number
of milliseconds needed to generate the report. Also, with more visitors’ data to
decrypt, the longer it will take to generate the report.
Figure 6.3 shows a graphical comparison of the time it takes to generate the
report when the data being stored in the database is unencrypted versus when
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Figure 6.3: # of Visitors vs Time to generate report in ms
it is encrypted. There is a linear increase in the time to generate the report
in milliseconds with an increase in the number of visitors for unencrypted and
encrypted tracking data. Also, the time to generate the report for encrypted data
is greater than the time for unencrypted data for each of the number of visitors
(500, 1000, 15000, and 2000), since there is the added overhead of decrypting the
encrypted data when generating the report, which is not required for the already
unencrypted data. Therefore, the encryption algorithm scales well.
Chapter 7
Discussion
My system encrypts the tracking data with a different symmetric key that expires
after a certain period of time. After that period has passed, that particular sym-
metric key is encrypted with my system’s public key, is stored in a database, and
a new symmetric key pair is created for the next week. Therefore, if the FBI came
knocking on my door on Week 5, where Week 1 is the first week after the system
was first implemented by the website owner, the FBI would have no way of being
able to access the data that was accumulated from Week 1 to 4. This is because my
system encrypts each of the symmetric keys that were used to encrypt the tracking
data with the website owner’s public key every week. The FBI would need to get
a hold of the private key in order to decrypt the symmetric keys, which is with the
website owner. Since the website owner is the only one who has access to the pri-
vate key, he can use his private key to decrypt each of the symmetric keys that was
encrypted with the public key. Now that the symmetric key has been decrypted,
he can use that symmetric key to decrypt the tracking data. The novelty is that
if the FBI comes knocking on the system owner’s door on day 3 of a 7-day week,
the system owner would only be able to divulge the analytical data for that week.
Therefore, if the system were implemented for 40 weeks so far, the system owner
would only have to be able to divulge 3 days worth of data as opposed to 280 days.
This bolsters the website owner’s confidentiality. It bolsters the owner’s integrity
in that it maintains the consistency, accuracy, and trustworthiness of data over
its entire life cycle[29]. My system ensures the site’s integrity by SSL-encrypting
the pathways from the browser to the server and from the server to the database,
preventing attackers from snooping on the data in transit.
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This scenario of safeguarding data is very closely related to a recent feud between
the tech giant, Apple Inc., and the FBI. In December 2015, there was a terrorist
attack carried out in San Bernadino, California by Syed Farook and his wife. The
investigation by the FBI has been ongoing for months and has asked that Apple
create a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several security
features, and install it on an iPhone recovered from the investigation, which was
being used by the terrorists. Though the FBI has maintained that they want this
new operating system for this phone only, by creating this iOS that bypasses these
security features, Apple has argued that it creates a backdoor. In essence, Apple
would be generating a “master” key that could be used over and over again, on
any number of devices, jeopardizing the privacy of Apple’s users.
My system’s main objective is to track user activity but to be able to store and
safeguard this information from hackers and government agencies like the FBI.
When visitors come to the WO’s website and perform activity, this tracking data is
being sent securely to the analytics site via SSL. When the analytical data reaches
the analytics site, it is encrypted with a symmetric key. When the expiration date
is up, the symmetric key is encrypted with a public key and a new symmetric
key pair is generated for the following week. The symmetric key along with its
corresponding ID is stored in its own database, called the symmetric key database.
Also, the data that is encrypted is stored in its own database along with its own ID
to distinguish it plus the same ID that was stored in the symmetric key database,
called the encrypted analytics data database. This is all the information that
is available to the FBI if they were to demand the data. Therefore, it would
be impossible to compromise the data that was gathered, since the encrypted
analytical data is incomprehensible as is. If the FBI needed to read it, they would
have to get a hold of the symmetric key in order to decrypt it. The only problem is
that the symmetric key is encrypted with a public key that would need its private
key counterpart in order to decrypt the symmetric key. The private key is with the
WO who is out of jurisdiction. Therefore, the way the system is setup, it would
not be possible for a FBI agent to compromise the data, bolstering the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of the system and the website owners that implement
it.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
I demonstrated how analytics data can be stored so that only the site owners
can view the data about their customers. With my design, even the analytics
site itself cannot decrypt the data after a given window of time has elapsed. The
novel aspect of my design is that the analytical data can be securely stored and
be protected against a government agency forcing the analytical site to release
the data of all users. Tracking data is encrypted with a symmetric key that is
then encrypted with a public key, and the symmetric key pair expires after a
short period of time prior to being stored in the database. After that window has
elapsed, the symmetric key is no longer accessible. Only the website owners have
access to the private key for a lengthy period of time that allows them to go back
and view the data.
8.1 Future Work
One of the things that my thesis did not address is “blindly” storing the keys
with the server such that the server is unaware of how many keys were stored and
their lengths. For my future work, I propose that the user keys be stored with
the tracking data in a secure, encrypted database using MongoDB. This is done
through Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (dynamic SSE) that allows
a client to store a dynamic collection of encrypted documents with a server, and
later quickly carry out keyword searches on these encrypted documents, while
revealing minimal information to the server. When building the dynamic SSE
scheme, “blind storage” is introduced, which allows a client to store a set of files
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on a remote server in such a way that the server does not learn how many files
are stored, or the lengths of the individual files. The approach in Reza Curtmola’s
work titled “Searchable Symmetric Encryption: Improved Definitions and Efficient
Constructions” formed the basis for my work[30].
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